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ARGUMENT 
At issue in CPG's conditional cross-appeal is whether the trial court erred in 
ruling that claims under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act may be brought by 
an assignee. As CPG noted in its opening brief, Utah law recognizes broad 
assignability of choses in action, including statutory claims. No statutory or policy 
reasons exist for exempting UCSPA claims from this general proposition. 
In response, Westgate argues that "only a consumer may bring a claim for 
damages," and, therefore, that assignments are prohibited. Response Brief of Cross-
Appellee at 20. There are two problems with that assertion. First, nowhere does the 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act use the word 'only' when establishing the actions 
a consumer may bring for damages suffered by a deceptive act or practice. 
The Act creates a statutory remedy, but not at the expense of any other 
remedy. Indeed, the Act makes clear that "[t]he remedies of this act are in addition to 
remedies otherwise available for the same conduct under state or local law[.]" Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-11-23; see also id. § 13-11-2 ("This act shall be construed liberally 
to promote the following policies: . . . (2) to protect consumers from suppliers who 
commit deceptive and unconscionable sales practices; [and] (3) to encourage the 
development of fair consumer sales practices[.]"). One remedy otherwise available 
to aggrieved persons under state law is to assign their damage claims to another for 
vindication. 
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Moreover, even if the statute said that "only" a consumer may bring a claim, 
that simply defines the class of persons protected by the statute, i.e., in whom does a 
chose in action vest? The legislature is aware of how to word a statute if it intends to 
bar the assignment of claims. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-422(l)(b)(i) and 
(3(a) (prohibiting assignment of workers' compensation claims, awards, benefits, or 
settlements), § 35A-3-112 (claims for public assistance not assignable). 
Westgate also argues that the class action limitations in the Utah Consumer 
Sales Practices Act must be read to prohibit CPG standing to advance claims which 
individual consumers have assigned to CPG. Id. at 22. Westgate seeks to imbue 
CPG's assigned claims with class action status, something neither CPG nor the trial 
court have sought to do. An aggregation or assignment of individual claims does not 
transform individual claims into a class action. As Westgate points out, specific 
procedures are required to be followed to certify and prosecute a class action case, 
procedures which are not present in this case. 
Westgate further argues that the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act bars 
standing to assignees because the Division of Consumer Protection is the only 
appointed enforcement authority. Id. at 21. Westgate's argument here ignores the 
Act's dual enforcement provisions; one the State's enforcement authority to vindicate 
the public interest, and the other the rights of individual consumers to seek remedies 
for damages caused by deceptive acts or practices. CPG has not sought to impose 
2 
any penalty under the State's enforcement authority. It has, instead, sought to 
vindicate the rights of the individual consumers who have assigned their right to 
damages to CPG. 
It is unquestioned that an action is assignable, notwithstanding that the 
assignment is made solely for the purpose of prosecuting the action. Mayer v. 
Rankin, 63 P. 2d 611, 616 (Utah 1936). Westgate argues that consumer protection 
claims are not assignable because consumer protection claims are "analogous" to tort 
claims. Response Brief of Cross-Appellee at 23. Although CPG does not see the 
analogy, Westgate is wrong in any event to assert that all tort claims are not 
assignable. 
As early as the Mayer decision, the Court noted that "[t]he rule of 
nonassignability no longer extends to all actions arising ex delicto." Mayer v. Rankin 
at 616. While injuries to the person's body, reputation or feelings may still be non-
assignable {See e.g., Mayer at 616, "libel, slander, assault, assault and battery, false 
imprisonment, for the recovery of a penalty"), "Utah law allows the assignment of a 
fraud claim." Russell Packard Development v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, f36; 78 
P. 3rd 616. 
It is not clear at all that consumer protection claims should be viewed as 
similar to tort claims rather than to economic claims. Consumer protection claims 
are intended to level the bargaining field between innocent, unsuspecting consumers 
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and large, powerful and sophisticated corporations engaged in systematic deceptive 
business practices. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-2 (the purposes of the Act include 
"to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable 
sales practices"). Because an assignment is the act of transferring to another one's 
property, interests or rights (6 Am. Jur. 2D, Assignments § 1(2010)), consumers 
should not be inhibited from transferring their claims based on such practices. 
It is ironic indeed that Westgate, a party that has been found to have made 
false and fraudulent representations and to have operated a scheme or artifice to 
defraud consumers, should oppose the assignment of consumer claims on the 
grounds that such assignments could result in consumers being cheated. Response 
Brief of Cross-Appellee at 24-25. While anything is conceivable and the possibility 
exists that consumers might be deceived when assigning their consumer claims, that 
argument could be used to abrogate all consumer transactions, since consumers can 
obviously be cheated when conducting consumer transactions. To use the possibility 
of wrongdoing by some parties to ban the transfer of a type of property would go 
contrary to the historical trend in the United States toward fewer restrictions on the 
alienation of property interests. 
Moreover, restricting the assignment of consumer claims would eviscerate the 
second prong of enforcement in the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, namely the 
right of consumers to seek remedy from deceptive sales practices. Westgate argues 
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that because the UPUAA provides for double actual damages and costs of suit and 
that the UCSPA awards $2,000 regardless of actual damages, "each consumer could 
have maintained an action against Westgate." Response Brief of Cross-Appellee at 
27. However, one reason for allowing the aggregation of consumer claims is that 
most people, even with the possibility of added recovery, will lack the motivation to 
litigate. If the Court precludes the assignment of consumer claims, more deceptive 
sales practices will go unchallenged. Such a policy would encourage the very 
behavior which Westgate was found to have perpetrated. 
In that same vein, Westgate agrees that the purpose of the private attorney 
general doctrine is to overcome the possibility of inaction when any individual's 
financial interest is insufficient to encourage private litigation to enforce the right. 
Response Brief of Cross-Appellee at 27. It is clear that allowing the aggregation of 
similar consumer claims and the prosecution of such claims such as that brought by 
CPG in fact advances societal interests. Allowing the recovery of attorney fees 
through the private attorney general doctrine helps to fulfill the purpose of the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act to protect consumers from suppliers who commit 
deceptive and unconscionable sales practices. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in CPG's brief of appellees and Cross-
Appellants, the Court should affirm the trial court's judgment, or in the alternative 
only, reverse the trial court's dismissal of CPG's Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
DATED this <?1 ^ day of March, 2011. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Z ^ 
L. Rich Hurapherys 
Karra J. Porter 
Scot A. Boyd 
Defendants/Counter claimants -
Appellees 
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